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Sterling financial markets(1)
Overview
Echoing developments globally, conditions in sterling capital
markets improved further since the previous Bulletin.  Despite
temporary bouts of investor nervousness, for example
following the release of weaker-than-expected Q3 UK GDP
data, asset prices continued their recovery from the lows in
March.  Financial market activity also picked up, including
some public issuance in markets that were previously closed,
such as the market for UK residential mortgage-backed
securities.  More generally, liquidity conditions improved
according to contacts and survey evidence (Chart 1).
The increases in asset prices and financial market activity
seemed to reflect perceptions of a gradual improvement in the
economic outlook in the United Kingdom and overseas.  At the
same time, continued accommodative monetary and fiscal
policies may have underpinned asset prices as worries about
the prospects of extreme downside risks, such as a collapse in
aggregate demand and/or financial system gridlock, subsided
further.  Asset purchases by the Bank are also likely to have
boosted asset prices by encouraging portfolio rebalancing
towards riskier assets and reducing required risk premia.
Nonetheless, sentiment in financial markets remained fragile.
Indeed, after the data cut-off for this article there was a
renewed period of market volatility linked to worries about the
possible wider implications of the potential default of the
Dubai World investment company. 
Recent developments in sterling capital markets
Monetary policy
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
continued to implement unconventional measures aimed at
supporting nominal demand in the economy.  Specifically,
alongside leaving Bank Rate unchanged at 0.5%, on
5 November the MPC voted to increase the scale of its
programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of
central bank reserves by £25 billion to £200 billion.  Those
purchases are due to be completed by the time of the MPC’s
February 2010 meeting.  More details of asset purchases made
to date and the Bank’s other operations are provided on
pages 266–71.
These unconventional policy measures — alongside those to
provide liquidity insurance — have led to a significant increase
in the size of the Bank’s balance sheet over the past year.
Chart 2 puts that expansion in a historical context:  relative to
annual GDP, the Bank’s balance sheet has become about as
large as at any point in the past two centuries.(2)
Short-term interest rates
Since the previous Bulletin, sterling overnight interest rates
traded within 10 basis points of Bank Rate (Chart 3).  As noted
in previous Bulletins, banks might usually be expected to
charge a premium for the credit risk associated with unsecured
interbank lending compared to secured transactions of
equivalent maturity.  So the fact that for much of the period
secured interest rates traded slightly above unsecured interest
This article reviews developments in sterling financial markets since the 2009 Q3 Quarterly Bulletin
up to end-November 2009.  The article also reviews the Bank’s official operations. 
Markets and operations
(1) The data cut-off for this section is 20 November.
(2) Fisher (2009), available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/
2009/speech413.pdf, provides a detailed discussion of the Bank’s operations and how
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Source:  Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey.
(a) Net respondents to the survey question:  ‘How would you rate liquidity conditions (eg depth
of markets, narrowness of bid-offer spreads, ease of execution etc) at this time?’.
Chart 1 Fund manager survey of market liquidity
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rates (as measured by sterling overnight index average
(SONIA) rates) probably reflected continued fragmentation in
money markets.  However, consistent with feedback from
market contacts that some money market participants shifted
from providing unsecured to secured lending, the spread
between secured and unsecured overnight interest rates had
narrowed by the end of the period.
Interest rates on meeting-to-meeting overnight index swaps
(OIS), which are indicative of expectations of future overnight
interest rates, were volatile (Chart 4).  Market contacts noted
that this was not related to expectations about a change in
Bank Rate over the next few months.  Instead, the volatility at
these short horizons was likely to have reflected speculation
following comments at the August Inflation Report press
conference that the Bank might review whether all reserves
balances held by commercial banks at the Bank should
continue to be remunerated at Bank Rate.
At its November meeting, the MPC discussed the merits of
changing the structure of remuneration on commercial bank
reserves.  The Committee concluded that such an action would
be unlikely to have a significant impact on the economic
outlook given the already low levels of short-term market
rates, and that asset purchases were likely to be a more
effective instrument for affecting monetary conditions at that
time.  While the MPC agreed not to make use of this option in
November, the Committee agreed that it might be a useful
policy tool in some circumstances and therefore should be
available in the future.
At longer horizons, market-based expectations of short-term
interest rates as measured by forward OIS rates fell (Chart 5),
consistent with a reappraisal by market participants about the
timing of the beginning of the withdrawal of the exceptional
degree of monetary stimulus.  Nevertheless, relative to the
Reuters poll of economists’ forecasts for Bank Rate, OIS rates
remained higher.  This divergence has persisted for several
months and could reflect the difference between mean and
modal expectations rather than differences in the expected
pace of monetary policy tightening.  Reuters surveys
economists’ views of the most likely outcome for future policy
rates (ie the poll reflects an average of modal expectations)
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Note:  The balance sheet observations are end-February for 1830–1966, end-year for 1967–2008
and November 2009.
Sources:  Consensus Economics Inc., ONS, www.measuringworth.org/datasets/ukgdp/
result.php# and Bank calculations.
(a) Famine/end of railroad boom (1847).
(b) Overextension of credit from 1855–66 (1857).
(c) Failure of Overend Gurney (1866).
(d) Failure of City of Glasgow Bank (1878).
(e) Support for Barings (1890).
(f) First World War (1914).
(g) Amalgamation of Treasury and Bank note issues (1928).
(h) Second World War (1939).
(i) Secondary Banking Crisis (1973).
(j) Small Banks Crisis (1991).
(k) Current crisis (2007).
The y-axis scale has been corrected since initial publication.  
Chart 2 Bank of England balance sheet as a percentage




















Sources:  BrokerTec, Wholesale Market Brokers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of weighted average secured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
(b) Spread of weighted average unsecured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
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Sources:  Bank of England and Bloomberg.
(a) For more details on these and other measures of market expectations of future Bank Rate,
see Joyce, M and Meldrum, A (2008), ‘Market expectations of future Bank Rate’, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 3, pages 274–82.   
Chart 4 Spread to Bank Rate of sterling short-term
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estimated modal path for OIS rates derived from options on
futures contracts that settle on the London interbank offered
rate (Libor).(1) This estimate of the modal path for OIS rates
indicated that market participants anticipated no increase in
policy rates until at least the second half of 2010.  
After the November MPC decision, the lower expected path
for policy rates was accompanied by reduced uncertainty
about future short-term sterling market interest rates
(Chart 6).  Because these implied volatility measures are
derived from options on Libor futures they will, in addition to
uncertainty about the future path of policy rates, also reflect
uncertainty about the spread between Libor and OIS rates.  
Long-term interest rates
Long-term sterling nominal forward rates rose up to horizons
of around 20 years but fell further out (Chart 7).  Chart 8
shows that at the five-year, five-year forward horizon this
reflected a pickup in long-term inflation forwards (derived
from the difference between yields on conventional and
index-linked gilts).  In contrast, real forward rates ended the
period broadly unchanged.
A number of factors might explain this increase in implied
sterling inflation forward rates.  First, it could have reflected a
genuine rise in inflation expectations.  The YouGov/Citigroup
survey indicated that the UK public’s inflation expectations
over the five to ten-year horizon rose slightly in October,
although they remained below levels in 2008.  
(1) For a description of the method used to construct modal expectations for OIS rates
see the box on pages 158–59 of the 2009 Q3 Bulletin, ‘An indicative decomposition of
















Sources:  Reuters and Bank calculations.
(a) Solid lines are as at 20 November.  Dashed lines are as at 28 August.
(b) Simple averages of poll contributors’ modal expectations of Bank Rate.
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(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curve.
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Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
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Sources:  Bank of England and YouGov/Citigroup.
(a) Derived from the Bank’s government swap liability curve.
(b) YouGov/Citigroup survey results of long-term public inflation expectations for five to ten
years ahead. 
(c) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curve.
Chart 8  Sterling five-year real interest rates and
inflation five years forward and long-run inflation
expectationsRecent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 261
Second, it could be that it was associated with an increase in
inflation risk premia — that is, an increase in the required
compensation for uncertainty about future inflation.
Contacts put more weight on this second explanation, linking
it to uncertainty about the timing and pace at which the
significant monetary policy stimulus would be withdrawn.
Perhaps consistent with this, information from options on
long-term interest rates suggested that implied volatility
rose (Chart 9).  
Contacts also noted that investors sought greater protection
against upside risks to inflation.  A distribution derived from
RPI inflation options suggested that investors placed slightly
more weight on very high outcomes for future RPI inflation
relative to very low outcomes (Chart 10).(1)
An alternative explanation for the rise in nominal five-year,
five-year forward rates is that it was related to factors specific
to the gilt market.  Consistent with this, measures of forward
inflation rates derived from inflation swaps were little changed
since the previous Bulletin (Chart 8).  Moreover, at similar
horizons, forward rates on OIS were little changed over the
period (Chart 11).
The divergence between gilt and OIS forward rates may reflect
changes in premia specific to UK government bonds.  Chart 12
shows that the gilt-OIS spread widened at horizons up to
around 20 years but narrowed at longer horizons.  This could
reflect investors rebalancing their portfolios across different
maturity segments of the gilt market, given that asset
purchases conducted by the Bank have likely affected the mix
of available gilts.  To the extent that investors prefer to hold
particular securities, bonds of different maturities may be
imperfect substitutes.  As a result, investors may be prepared
to pay more for those bonds relative to others, which would
affect their yields relative to OIS rates.
In addition, contacts noted that gilt yields were affected by
concerns about how the gilt market would absorb the scale of
prospective issuance by the UK Debt Management Office
and/or potential gilt sales by the Bank.  Similarly, because of
the projected UK government debt position, investors
might also have become more concerned about the
United Kingdom’s credit standing and demanded additional
compensation to hold gilts.  The premia on long-horizon UK
sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) rose both in absolute
terms and relative to other triple-A rated sovereign borrowers,
but remained below their peaks earlier in the year (Chart 13).
(1) For more discussion of RPI options see the box ‘UK RPI inflation options’ on page 163














Source:  Barclays Capital.
Chart 9 Sterling normalised swaption implied volatility
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Sources:  Royal Bank of Scotland and Bank calculations.
(a) Implied from prices of options on UK RPI inflation.  For a more detailed discussion of RPI
inflation options see the box ‘UK RPI inflation options’ in 2009 Q3 Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, page 163.
(b) Latest date within the review period for which quotes for options at multiple strikes were
available.
(c) Probability that RPI inflation will fall within a 0.5% range, centred on x-axis value (except for
the distribution tails which extend for noted value onward).
Chart 10 Average probability distribution of annual RPI
















(a) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curve.
(b) Derived from overnight index swaps (OIS).
Chart 11 Sterling nominal five-year interest rates,
five years forward262 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q4
Foreign exchange
The sterling effective exchange rate index (ERI) depreciated by
1.3% compared with its value at the time of the previous
Bulletin.  But this masked a sharper depreciation in sterling
against the major currencies during September and early
October followed by a subsequent appreciation (Chart 14).
Over the period as a whole, sterling appreciated by 1.2%
against the US dollar and depreciated by around 2% against
the euro.
In light of these moves, the sterling ERI remained around 23%
lower than in mid-2007.  Adjusting for differences in consumer
price levels in the United Kingdom and overseas, the real
sterling ERI has returned close to its level in the mid-1990s.
Perceptions about the relative cyclical prospects for the UK
economy, which in principle might be expected to affect real
returns on sterling-denominated assets compared with assets
denominated in other currencies, cannot explain the scale of
sterling’s real depreciation since the summer of 2007.(1) But
over the latest quarter at least, unexpected shifts in real
interest rate differentials across countries do seem to broadly
account for changes in the (real) sterling ERI (Chart 15).
Consistent with this, market contacts suggested that
perceptions about the near-term outlook for the UK economy
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Sources:  Markit Group Limited and Bank calculations.
(a) Calculated using ten-year sovereign CDS premia for:  Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden and
the United States.















(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curve and overnight
index swaps.
Chart 12 Sterling gilt-OIS forward spreads(a)
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations. 
Chart 14 Percentage changes in selected bilateral
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Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) For more information on the analytics required to isolate the impact of interest rate ‘news’
on exchange rates, see Brigden, A, Martin, B and Salmon, C (1997), ‘Decomposing exchange
rate movements according to the uncovered interest rate parity condition’, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, November, pages 377–89.
Chart 15 Implied contribution of real interest rate ‘news’
to cumulative changes in the sterling ERI since previous
Bulletin(a)
(1) Possible explanations for the depreciation in sterling over recent years are discussed in
Astley, M, Pain, D and Smith, J (2009), ‘Interpreting recent movements in sterling’,
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 3, pages 202–14.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 263
Bank funding markets
Conditions in short-term sterling interbank money markets
continued to improve.  Contacts noted greater funding
opportunities out to three months, particularly for
higher-rated money market participants.  Perhaps consistent
with this, the spread between the three-month Libor fixing
and equivalent-maturity OIS rates narrowed further and
approached its level prior to the start of the turmoil in financial
markets (Chart 16).  Funding at maturities greater than three
months remained patchy.
An improvement in the perceived financial strength of the
banks in the sterling Libor panel was generally reflected in
continued falls in their CDS premia and likely contributed to
the falls in Libor-OIS spreads.  However, whereas Libor-OIS
spreads returned close to their pre-crisis average levels, bank
CDS premia remained elevated.
A number of factors may have contributed to this.  For
example, some contacts suggested that Libor fixings (based on
contributing banks’ quotes rather than actual transacted rates)
may potentially underestimate the true cost of funding in size
beyond three months where lending volumes remained low.
Conversely, short-maturity credit default swaps reportedly
remained relatively illiquid and may therefore overstate the
underlying compensation for default risk.
Alternatively, the narrowing in Libor-OIS spreads could be
related to banks’ reduced need to borrow at term in the
sterling money market.  The increased size of the Bank’s
balance sheet since the onset of the financial crisis has
increased available liquid funds.  Moreover, with institutions
still engaged in balance sheet repair, banks have been wary of
borrowing from wholesale markets, preferring, where possible,
to raise longer-term funds in capital markets.  As a result,
some non-bank investors that traditionally lend to
high-quality banks may have had little option but to accept
lower rates given the reduced appetite to borrow.  Taken
together, these factors could have contributed to lower Libors.
Difficulties associated with obtaining short-term funding via
cross-currency swap markets also continued to abate.  And at
longer horizons, funding conditions for UK banks reportedly
improved, albeit gradually.  UK banks issued senior debt under
the Government’s guarantee scheme as well as on an
unguaranteed basis (Chart 17).  Lloyds Banking Group (LBG)
announced new capital raising plans, offering an exchange of
existing capital instruments into Enhanced Capital Notes
(ECNs) designed to convert into equity should the bank’s core
Tier 1 capital fall below 5%.  There was strong demand for
these new notes, although uncertainties remained over how
the market for ECNs would evolve in the future.
Some primary markets for UK asset-backed securities
reopened, with UK banks issuing covered bonds and the first
public issuance of UK residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) since May 2008 (Chart 18).  The new securities from
Lloyds’ Permanent and Nationwide’s Silverstone Master Trust
programmes both included an option for investors to sell the
notes back to the issuer at their expected maturity dates.
Contacts said that this helped underpin investor demand by
addressing concerns about extension risk (the risk that
mortgagors repay their loans slower than anticipated, which
would mean that the bonds would not mature on their
expected maturity dates).  However, demand was reportedly
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Three-month London interbank offered rate (Libor) spreads over equivalent-maturity OIS
rates.
(b) Three-month Libor forward spreads over equivalent-maturity forward OIS rates. 
Chart 16 Three-month interbank rates and spreads
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Unguaranteed senior debt spread(c) (left-hand scale)
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Basis points £ billion equivalent
Sources:  Dealogic, JPMorgan Chase and Co. and Bank calculations.
(a) Issuance with a value greater than or equal to US$500 million equivalent and original
maturity greater than one year.  Data were converted into sterling using monthly averages of
the sterling-dollar exchange rate.
(b) Senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
(c) Secondary market spread to swaps for sterling and euro unguaranteed senior debt.  Simple
average of spreads for Barclays, HSBC, LBG and RBS sterling and euro senior debt.
Chart 17 UK bank senior debt issuance(a) and spreads264 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q4
Corporate credit markets 
Conditions in credit markets also continued to
easefor non-financial companies.  Spreads on
sterling-denominated corporate bonds narrowed,
especiallyfor non-investment grade bonds.  Indeed, the
sharp widening in spreads in Autumn 2008, when the
turmoil in financial markets intensified, has been largely
unwound, although spreads remained above their average
levels over the past decade (Chart 19).  
Although perceptions of corporate default risk may have fallen
a little over recent months, much of the reduction in spreads,
and in turn the cost of issuing corporate bonds in the primary
market, has been associated with a decline in illiquidity
premia.  Consistent with this, secondary market bid-offer
spreads narrowed and banks reportedly dedicated more
balance sheet and resources to market-making in corporate
bonds.  The Bank’s Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme
is reported to have been supportive of these improvements,
although trading conditions in secondary markets continue to
be somewhat restricted (see the box on page 269).
Despite brief episodes of weaker market sentiment, investor
demand for corporate bonds generally remained strong,
especially in the primary market — 2009 will be a record year
for issuance.  Contacts also noted that investors with less
restrictive investment mandates became more willing to invest
in riskier assets. 
Investment-grade firms, with better access to the capital
markets, appear to have benefited most from the
improvements in corporate bond market conditions.  Issuance
by lower-rated borrowers nonetheless also increased since the
previous Bulletin (Chart 20).  This included issuance from firms
that had previously never accessed capital markets before, as
well as from non-rated companies and private placements.
Overall, given the continued limited supply of bank lending,
the ability of corporates to issue bonds reportedly helped to
alleviate somewhat their near-term refinancing concerns.
Smaller firms, on the other hand, that were typically unable to
access capital markets, remained credit constrained and
sought ways to extend the maturity of their existing loans.
Equity markets
Against the background of the general upward trend in risky
asset prices, UK equity prices rose further, by around 7%
(Chart 21).  Since the March 2009 lows, the FTSE All-Share
Non-investment grade (right-hand scale)
Investment grade (left-hand scale)























Sources:  Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations. 





















Sources:  Bank of England, Dealogic and Bank calculations. 
(a) Gross issuance data refer to bond issuance by UK private non-financial corporations in all
currencies by rating.  Data for November 2009 include issuance until 17 November.  
(b) Also includes bonds that were not allocated a rating reference by Dealogic.
(c) Net issuance data cover bond issuance by UK-resident companies and sterling-denominated
bonds issued in the United Kingdom by non-resident companies.
Chart 20 Gross(a) and net bond issuance by UK
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Sources:  JPMorgan Chase and Co. and Bank calculations.
(a) Retained and public issuance.
(b) All-currency RMBS issued by UK residents, converted to sterling at prevailing exchange rates
as at date of issue.  Excludes UK-based but foreign-owned SPV issuance backed by foreign
collateral. 
(c) Spread of benchmark AAA five-year UK RMBS yields to three-month Libor.
Chart 18 UK RMBS issuance(a) and spreadsRecent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 265
index increased by around 50%, but it remained around 20%
lower than its level in early 2008.
A number of UK firms reported stronger-than-expected
earnings for the third quarter.  This, and forward-looking
indicators pointing to an improved outlook for the global
economy, may have encouraged investors to reassess the
prospects for UK corporate earnings.
Analysts’ forecasts for company earnings over the next few
years were revised marginally higher over the quarter,
although the projections remained much lower than those
made in early 2009 (Chart 22).  This pattern was mirrored
in market-based measures of future dividends implied from
dividend swaps which also picked up, albeit from low levels.
Alongside a slightly improved outlook for earnings, the returns
required by investors to compensate for the risk of holding
equities may have fallen further.  For example, contacts noted
fewer concerns about extreme downside risks, not least in part
due to accommodative monetary and fiscal policies.
Information from options prices suggested that the weight
attached by market participants to the possibility of a large fall
in equity prices fell slightly (Chart 23).  The asset purchase
schemes implemented by different countries, including the
United Kingdom, may also have contributed to higher equity
prices by encouraging investors to rebalance their portfolios
away from gilts towards riskier assets.
Despite their rapid rise since March, the level of UK equity
prices did not look particularly elevated compared with
long-run averages of simple valuation metrics.  For example,
the price-earnings ratio remained below its average since
1990, and the dividend yield was close to its average
(Chart 24).  Similarly, a measure based on a comparison of
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
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(a) Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) uses Consensus forecasts of earnings per share
by sell-side analysts.
(b) Data refer to earnings per share on the FTSE All-Share index.  Forecasts are denoted by
dashed lines, and outturns are denoted by the solid line.
(c) The actual and forecast figures for a specific year relate to companies’ annual results that
have a year end between start-June of that year and end-May of the following year.
(d) Refers to forecast data available at the data cut-off for each Bulletin.
Chart 22 Actual and IBES forecasts for earnings per













Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
(a) Calculated from the risk-neutral distribution of returns from six-month option prices.
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Dividend yield(a) (left-hand scale, per cent)
Dashed lines are averages from 1990
Tobin’s Q(b) (left-hand scale, ratio)
Sources:  National Statistics, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations. 
(a) Price-earnings ratio and dividend yield are for the FTSE All-Share index.
(b) Tobin’s Q refers to UK private non-financial corporations.
Chart 24 UK equity valuation measures266 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q4
they own — so-called Tobin’s Q — was also below its recent
historical average.(1) Nonetheless, some market participants
expressed worries that equity prices might have increased too
far relative to the improvement in underlying macroeconomic
fundamentals.
Bank of England operations
The Bank’s balance sheet enables the Bank to fulfil its core
purposes to promote and maintain monetary and financial
stability.  At the end of the review period to 20 November, the
size of the balance sheet was £235 billion.  This was larger than
at the end of the previous review period to 28 August but
below its earlier highs (Chart 25 and Chart 26).  
The composition of the balance sheet, in particular on the
asset side, also continued to change.  This reflected a shift
away from liquidity insurance provision towards policies to
support nominal demand through asset purchases.  Over the
review period, the former is shown as a reduction in the
amount outstanding in the Bank’s extended-collateral
long-term repo open market operations (OMOs) (Chart 25).
The latter is shown as an increase in ‘other assets’ which in
turn reflects an increase in the loan the Bank has made to the
Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited (BEAPFF)
(Chart 25).(2) Those asset purchases have resulted in a
significant increase in reserves balances (Chart 26).  The
remainder of this section describes the Bank’s operations over
the review period in more detail. 
Asset purchases(3)
In the week prior to the November MPC meeting, the Bank
completed the £175 billion of private and public sector asset
purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves
that had been announced on 5 March and extended on 7 May
and 6 August.  On 5 November, the MPC voted to continue
with this programme of asset purchases and to increase its size
by £25 billion to £200 billion.  Table A summarises asset
purchases by type of asset.(4)
Gilts
As of 19 November, £178 billion of gilts had been purchased
under the asset purchase programme, of which £80 billion
were in the 3–10 year residual maturity range, £80 billion in
the 10–25 year maturity range and £18 billion had a maturity
greater than 25 years (Chart 27).
These gilt purchases took place over 79 auctions, which varied
in size up to a maximum of £3.5 billion.  The size of the
auctions between the 6 August and 5 November MPC
decisions were £1.4 billion.  Following the MPC’s decision on
5 November to increase the scale of the programme of asset
purchases financed by central bank reserves to £200 billion,
the size of the auctions was increased to £1.7 billion. 
The Bank also announced on 5 November that while it would
continue, normally, to conduct auctions to purchase gilts with
a residual maturity of 10–25 years on Mondays;  of over
25 years on Tuesdays;  and of 3–10 years on Wednesdays, these
auctions would be spread over a two-week cycle.  In the week
beginning 9 November, auctions were held on Monday and
Wednesday and an auction was held on the Tuesday of the
subsequent week.  This cycle was repeated in subsequent
weeks.
(1) For a discussion of this measure see Thompson, J and Mac Gorain, S (2002), ‘Profit
expectations and investment’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Winter,
pages 404–09.
(2) As described in previous Bulletins, asset purchases are undertaken by the BEAPFF
which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bank of England.  The BEAPFF borrows from
the Bank for the purchases it makes.
(3) The data cut-off for this subsection is 19 November.
(4) The objectives and operation of the Asset Purchase Facility are described in more
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Chart 26 Bank of England consolidated balance sheet:
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Cover in the auctions varied, but averaged 3.2 in the 3–10 year
auctions, 2.3 in the 10–25 year auctions and 1.9 in the auctions
for gilts with a maturity greater than 25 years (Chart 28).(1)
As purchases progressed, the Bank had earlier acquired a
sizable proportion (around 70%) of the free float (the total
issue size of a gilt minus government holdings) in four gilts,
which had subsequently been suspended from auctions until
further notice.(2) As the Bank’s holdings as a proportion of the
free float fell in three of these gilts following further issuance
by the UK Debt Management Office (DMO), these bonds were
made eligible.(3)
The Bank continued to lend some of the gilts via the DMO in
return for other UK government collateral, as announced on
6August.  The Bank announced on 14 October that between
7August and 30 September an average daily value of
£4.8 billion had been lent in this way. 
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
The functioning of the non-bank investment-grade European
commercial paper market improved further over the review
period.  Although the total amount of sterling-denominated
CP outstanding for UK corporate and non-bank financial firms
declined over the period from £6.3 billion to £4.1 billion
(Chart 29), this was partially offset by foreign currency
denominated issuance.  Corporates were also able to raise a
greater proportion of their funding through longer-term
issuance in the corporate bond market.
Quoted primary market CP spreads narrowed further and
remained below the spreads at which the Asset Purchase
Facility (APF) offers to purchase CP.  This meant that some
issuers found it more economic to issue to investors rather
than use the APF.  The facility reportedly acted as a backstop,
for example following temporary reductions in market
liquidity.  As a result, gross purchases over the period were
£1.3 billion compared with redemptions of £2.3 billion.  As of
19 November, APF holdings of CP amounted to £0.6 billion,


































(a) Data based on settled transactions.
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(a) On 6 August, the short-maturity bucket changed from 5–10 years to 3–10 years.  The
medium and long-maturity buckets are 10–25 years and greater than 25 years respectively.
Chart 28 Cover ratios in APF gilt auction
(1) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
(2) The 5% 2014, 4.75% 2020, 8% 2021 and 4% 2022 gilts.
(3) 4% 2022 on 12 October, 4.75% 2020 on 26 October, 5% 2014 on 11 November.
Table A Asset purchases by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial Gilts Corporate Total(b)
paper bonds
27 August 2009(c)(d) 1,573 134,971 938 137,482
3 September 2009 0 2,800 32 2,832
10 September 2009 5 5,604 27 5,636
17 September 2009 225 4,200 32 4,457
24 September 2009 395 4,201 51 4,647
1 October 2009 225 4,200 72 4,497
8 October 2009 80 4,200 139 4,419
15 October 2009 25 4,200 33 4,258
22 October 2009 145 4,201 13 4,359
29 October 2009 0 4,200 62 4,262
5 November 2009 0 0 63 63
12 November 2009 0 3,400 60 3,460
19 November 2009 70 1,700 13 1,783
Total financed by Treasury bills – – – –
Total financed by central  588 177,875 1,522 179,985
bank reserves(d)
Total asset purchases(d) 588 177,875 1,522 179,985
(a) Week-ended amounts are in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, on a trade-day basis, rounded to
the nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Measured as amount outstanding as at 27 August 2009.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
Amounts outstanding may be less than total purchases due to assets maturing during the period.268 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q4
Corporate bonds
The Bank’s Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme aims to
facilitate market-making by banks and dealers, to help reduce
illiquidity premia and so remove obstacles to corporates’
access to capital markets.  To fulfil this aim the Bank offers to
make regular small purchases of a wide range of high-quality
corporate bonds by reverse auctions.  These operations are
currently carried out three times a week, split by maturity, with
the Bank offering to purchase each eligible bond once a week.
Following a reduction in activity during July and early August,
participation in the Bank’s auctions increased modestly, with
an average of £161.5 million offered to the Bank each week
over the review period, and £49.3 million purchased
(Chart 30). 
The volume and number of offers in the Bank’s auctions was
higher following periods of volatility in corporate bond
markets.  For example, on 2 October the Bank received
£332 million in offers and purchased £102 million, as
corporate bond and CDS spreads widened and market contacts
reported a temporary deterioration in market sentiment.
As of 19 November, the corporate bond portfolio totalled
£1,522 million, compared to £938 million on 27 August.  The
portfolio had been acquired through 630 purchases of
144 bonds of 53 issuers, spread over 86 auctions from
25 March to 19 November.
On 3 December, the Bank launched a consultation process on
proposals for a possible extension to the Scheme through the
BEAPFF operating as a seller, as well as a buyer, of corporate
bonds.  The proposals are aimed at improving secondary
market liquidity further.  See the box on page 269. 
Secured commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.  There has been no
usage of the facility to date.(1)
Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Bank did not make any purchases of bank debt issued
under the Credit Guarantee Scheme from the secondary
market, but stands ready to do so should conditions in that
market deteriorate.
Operations within the sterling monetary framework(2)
Since the announcement of the programme of asset purchases
financed by central bank reserves on 5 March, the usual
system, in which banks chose monthly reserves targets to
achieve on average over a maintenance period, has been
suspended and all reserves balances have been remunerated at
Bank Rate.(3) Since 6 August, the Bank has continued to offer
reserves in long-term repo open market operations (OMOs),
but has not conducted short-term OMOs.  During the period
under review, the level of reserves was thus determined by
(i) the level of reserves injected via asset purchases, (ii) the
reserves supplied in long-term repo OMOs, and (iii) the net
impact of other sterling (‘autonomous factor’) flows across the
Bank’s balance sheet.
Long-term repo OMOs
The Bank continued to provide liquidity insurance by
conducting extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs with a
three-month maturity against a wider range of collateral than
routinely accepted in the Bank’s short-term OMOs and
(1) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.
(2) This and the subsection describing other market operations cover operations from
6August to 20 November.
(3) This article however continues to use the term ‘maintenance period’ for convenience

















  excluding APF purchases 
Sources:  CP Ware and Bank calculations.
Chart 29  Sterling commercial paper outstanding for UK























Amounts of bonds purchased (left-hand scale)
Number of allocated offers (right-hand scale)
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2009
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(a) Weekly (Friday-Thursday) amounts in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, on a
trade-day basis.
Chart 30  Weekly purchases of sterling corporate
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Asset Purchase Facility Corporate Bond
Secondary Market Scheme
The introduction, in March, of the Bank of England’s
programme of auctions to purchase small amounts of
high-quality sterling corporate bonds can be viewed as a
response to the problems facing the market and akin to the
Bank acting as a ‘market maker of last resort’.(1) As dealers
withdrew, due to a combination of capital constraints and risk
aversion, market liquidity had become impaired.  As such, the
Scheme’s primary objective was to improve market liquidity in
order to support the flow of credit to the corporate sector.  A
key step in the mechanism to achieve this objective was to
improve price discovery and transparency through offering to
undertake frequent transactions and help establish pricing
points.  Furthermore, its aim was to be catalytic, helping to
reinvigorate the market, rather than replace it.
To date the Bank’s purchases have had some success in
establishing pricing points and improving price discovery.
Counterparties report that the disclosure of auction results
reduced the uncertainty for investors in valuing their portfolios
and established, for dealers, a price at which others were
willing to sell.  The Scheme also helped dealers to manage
their inventory of securities, thus freeing up balance sheet
capacity.
Since the launch of the Scheme, conditions in the sterling
corporate bond market have, overall, improved.  This has
occurred alongside a general improvement in sentiment in
global credit markets.  During 2009, gross bond issuance has
been strong and net issuance has also increased.  For new
issues, the ‘new issuance premium’ (ie the difference between
the yields based on the offer price and the secondary market
price) fell, dropping from between 75 basis points to 100 basis
points in January to perhaps less than 10 basis points.
Conditions in the secondary market also improved, with both
credit (Chart 19) and bid-offer spreads narrowing considerably
from their highs in March 2009.  Some indicators of market
liquidity, such as the difference between corporate bond
spreads and credit default swap premia, improved for bonds
that were eligible for purchases by the APF and for those that
were not.
Despite strong primary market issuance, the secondary market
is still not functioning well with trading volumes remaining at
low levels.  And, although reduced, bid-offer spreads remained
elevated.  Dealers’ capacity to support market functioning has,
at times, continued to be limited by balance sheet constraints.
When demand for corporate bonds has been notably strong,
dealers have not always been able to meet that demand.  As a
result, contacts consistently highlight that the sterling
corporate bond market remains prone to bouts of illiquidity.
Earlier this year this manifested itself in an absence of buyers;
recently periods of illiquidity have more commonly been due
to potential buyers finding it difficult to source bonds that
meet their requirements.  Market intelligence also suggests
that many dealers (and indeed some investors) have been
cautious of offering bonds to the APF during times of strong
demand as they have no certainty of being able to buy the
bonds back should clients demand them in the future.  As a
consequence, market participants may not have fully utilised
the current Scheme.
On 3 December, the Bank launched a consultation process on
proposals for a possible extension to the APF.(2) The proposals
are aimed at improving secondary market liquidity further by
the BEAPFF operating as a seller, as well as a buyer, of bonds.
Starting to offer for sale the APF holdings of corporate bonds,
while continuing to offer to buy (both in small quantities),
would be intended to support price transparency and improve
two-way liquidity through the establishment of pricing points.
Any sales would be in addition to the Scheme’s existing
purchase programme.  As such, the overall size of the Bank’s
portfolio of corporate bonds would vary in line with the
intensity of offers by market participants to both buy and sell
bonds to the Scheme;  the Bank would not target any
particular portfolio size.  Any net reduction in the stock of
purchases would be offset by gilt purchases while the MPC’s
programme of asset purchases continued.  As before, such a
policy would be designed in such a way that all transactions
would move back towards private sector participants as soon
as markets fully recover.
(1) See www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech410.pdf.
(2) See www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice091203.pdf.270 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q4
Operational Standing Facilities (OSFs).  The results of these
operations are shown in Table B.  
All three-month extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs
over the review period were uncovered.  This resulted in a
decline in the stock of long-term repo OMOs outstanding
(Chart 25).  In light of revealed demand for funds in these
operations, from the operation on 15 September, the Bank
reduced the amount on offer from £10 billion to £5 billion.  
For the period under review, the Bank continued to set
two minimum bid rates applicable to its three-month
extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs.  The minimum bid
rate for bids against routine OMO collateral remained at the
higher of the equivalent-maturity OIS rate and Bank Rate.  For
bids against the wider collateral pool, the minimum bid rate
remained 50 basis points higher than that for routine OMO
collateral.
Repo operations at six, nine and twelve-month maturities were
offered against collateral routinely accepted in the Bank’s
short-term OMOs and OSFs.  In contrast to the repo
operations at three-month maturity all of these operations
were covered (Table C).
Operational Standing Facilities
As part of the changes to the sterling monetary framework
(SMF) introduced on 5 March, the Bank announced that, if
Bank Rate was set at 0.5% or below, the rate paid on the
Operational Standing Deposit Facility would be zero, while the
rate charged on the Operational Standing Lending Facility
would continue to be set at 25 basis points above Bank Rate.
As a result of the change to remunerate all reserves balances
at Bank Rate and (given the level of Bank Rate) the reduction
in the rate paid on the Operational Standing Deposit Facility to
Table B Extended-collateral three-month long-term repo
operations
18 August 2009
On offer (£ millions) 10,000 
Cover 0.53
Weighted average rate(a) 0.935
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.510
Tail(b) 0.43
1 September 2009
On offer (£ millions) 10,000 
Cover 0.38
Weighted average rate(a) 0.511
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.01
15 September 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Cover 0.43
Weighted average rate(a) 0.625
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.12
29 September 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Cover 0.34
Weighted average rate(a) 0.505
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.00
13 October 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Cover 0.41
Weighted average rate(a) 0.558
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.06
3 November 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Cover 0.85
Weighted average rate(a) 0.705
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.20
17 November 2009
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Cover 0.69
Weighted average rate(a) 0.926
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.530
Tail(b) 0.40
(a) Per cent.
(b) The yield tail measures, in basis points, the difference between the weighted average accepted rate and the
lowest accepted rate.
Table C Long-term repo operations
Six-month Nine-month Twelve-month
18 August 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 2.33 2.13 4.25
Weighted average rate(a) 0.406 0.466 0.693
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.396 0.440 0.688
Tail(b) 0.01 0.03 0.01
15 September 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 3.27 3.75 4.75
Weighted average rate(a) 0.373 0.483 0.738
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.360 0.450 0.730
Tail(b) 0.01 0.03 0.01
13 October 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 3.33 3.13 4.00
Weighted average rate(a) 0.400 0.480 0.620
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.385 0.480 0.620
Tail(b) 0.02 0.00 0.00
17 November 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 2.83 4.35 4.75
Weighted average rate(a) 0.452 0.526 0.670
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.443 0.511 0.650
Tail(b) 0.01 0.01 0.02
(a) Per cent.
(b) The yield tail measures, in basis points, the difference between the weighted average accepted rate and the
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zero, daily average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in
each of the maintenance periods under review.  Average usage
of the lending facility was also £0 million throughout the
period. 
Discount Window Facility
In October 2008, the Bank introduced a Discount Window
Facility (DWF) as part of the framework for its operations in
the sterling money markets.  The DWF is a permanent facility
to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system and
allows eligible banks and building societies to borrow gilts
against a wide range of collateral.  
On 6 October, the Bank announced that the average daily
amount outstanding in the 30-day Discount Window Facility
between 1 April and 30 June 2009 was £0 million.
Changes to haircuts applied to eligible securities
On 25 September, the Bank announced some changes to the
haircuts it applies to securities accepted as collateral in its
operations.  In addition to changes to haircut levels, a greater
number of haircut categories were introduced for bonds with
different maturities.(1)
Changes to the eligibility criteria for access to SMF
facilities
On 5 October, the Bank announced that it had widened the
population of institutions eligible to apply for reserves
accounts in order to assist smaller institutions in managing
their liquidity.  Previously, only firms required to place cash
ratio deposits (CRDs) with the Bank — that is, institutions with
an average level of eligible liabilities of £500 million or more —
were eligible to apply for reserves accounts.  With effect from
5 October 2009, all institutions that are subject to the
statutory CRD regime — that is all institutions reporting their
eligible liabilities to the Bank — are eligible to apply for a
reserves account.  Newly eligible institutions would also be
able to apply to access the other SMF facilities:  the
Operational Standing Facilities, the Discount Window Facility
and open market operations.(2)
Other market operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The drawdown period for the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)
closed on 30 January 2009.  Although the drawdown window
to access the SLS has closed, the Scheme will remain in place
for three years, thereby providing participating institutions
with continuing liquidity support.
US dollar repo operations
In concert with other central banks, since 18 September 2008
the Bank has offered US dollar financing to financial
institutions funded by a swap with the Federal Reserve.  These
measures are designed to improve the liquidity conditions in
global financial markets.
Over the previous review period the Bank offered US dollar
financing at one-week and three-month maturities.  In light of
the reduced use of these operations, the Bank announced on
24 September that, following a 91-day auction on 6 October,
all further three-month operations would be suspended.  All
further scheduled operations would be seven days, with the
exception of eleven and ten-day operations in December.  The
Bank announced operations up until 27 January 2010.
Since the previous Bulletin, the total stock outstanding
($13 million) was unchanged.  However, following the
suspension of the longer-dated operations, by 6 November all
this stock was of one-week maturity.
As previously announced, since 6 April, the Bank, along with
other central banks, has had swap arrangements in place that
would enable the provision of foreign currency liquidity by the
Federal Reserve to US financial institutions.  Should it be
required, the Bank would provide sterling via a swap
arrangement with the Federal Reserve, similar to that which
underpins the Bank’s US dollar repo operations.
Foreign reserves
As part of the monetary policy framework introduced by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1997, the Bank of England holds
its own foreign exchange reserves in support of its monetary
policy objective.  These reserves are separate from the
Government’s foreign exchange reserves, which the Bank
manages as HM Treasury’s agent.  The assets held in the Bank’s
reserves are included in the balance sheet under ‘bonds and
other securities acquired via market transactions’ (Chart 25).
They are financed with medium-term foreign currency
securities issued by the Bank (Chart 26).  At 20 November, the
Bank’s foreign exchange reserves comprised £4 billion of
assets.
Capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, for example in the Bank for International Settlements
and European Central Bank, and the Bank’s physical assets),
and aggregate cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
changes in investment policy.
The portfolio currently includes around £3.2 billion of gilts and
£1 billion of other debt securities.  Over the period from
6August to 20 November, gilt purchases of £258 million in
six purchase transactions were made in accordance with the
quarterly announcements on 1 July 2009 and 1 October 2009.
(1) Further details are available in a Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090925.pdf.
(2) Further details are available in the consolidated Market Notice dated 13 November,
available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice091113con.pdf.